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Abstract In this paper, an approach is presented to calculate high-resolution first-best air
pollution tolls with respect to emission cost factors provided by Maibach et al. (2008). Dy-
namic traffic flows of a multi-agent transport simulation are linked to detailed air pollution
emission factors. The monetary equivalent of emissions is internalized in a policy which
is then used as a benchmark for evaluating the effects of a regulatory measure — a speed
limitation to 30 km/h in the inner city of Munich. The calculated toll, which is equal to
simulated marginal costs in terms of individual vehicle attributes and time-dependent traffic
states, results in average air pollution costs that are very close to values in the literature. It is
found that the regulatory measure is considerably less successful in terms of total emission
reduction. It reduces emissions of urban travelers too strongly while even increasing the
emissions of commuters and freight, both leading to a increase in deadweight loss. That is,
the regulatory measure leads to higher market inefficiencies than a “do-nothing” strategy:
too high generalized prices for urban travelers, too low generalized prices for commuters
and freight. Finally, long-term changes in the vehicle fleet fuel efficiency are assumed as a
reaction to the Internalization policy. The results indicate, however, that the long-term effect
of emission reduction is dominated by the short-term reactions and by the assumed improve-
ment in fleet fuel efficiency; the influence of the resulting route and mode choice decisions
turns out to be relatively small.
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1 Introduction
External costs in the transport sector are known to lead to inefficiencies and social welfare
losses. This is due to the fact that people base their decisions on marginal private costs
(MPC) and not on marginal social costs (MSC), which is a result of market failures. The
idea of how to internalize the difference between MSC and prices by a toll has been studied
widely in the transportation economic literature (see, e.g., Vickrey, 1969; Arnott et al., 1993;
Friesz et al., 2004). The most important dimensions of external costs are usually found to be
congestion, air pollution, accidents, and noise. However, optimal toll levels are difficult to
compute since they depend on various factors: in principle, a calculation needs to be done (i)
for every street in the network, (ii) for every time step, and, when assuming heterogeneous
travelers, additionally (iii) for every traveler that is defined by her characteristics such as
individual Values of Travel Time Savings (VTTS) or specific vehicle attributes. Additionally,
linkages to other sectors of the economy need to be accounted for (de Palma and Lindsey,
2004). For these reasons, so-called second-best pricing has been advanced (Verhoef, 2001).
The computation of second-best tolls has been addressed in several studies (Verhoef,
2002; van den Berg and Verhoef, 2011; Markose et al., 2007). However, most studies focus
on congestion pricing (see for exceptions, e.g., Mitchell et al. (2002); Namdeo and Mitchell
(2007)). This is consistent with current estimates that congestion causes the largest part of
the external effects (see Maibach et al. (2008), p.103). There is, however, some perception
that non-congestion external effects need to be addressed as well (Creutzig and He, 2009);
those become especially important for freight traffic (Maibach et al., 2008). In this context, it
is important to consider regulatory measures that are not based on charging. These might be
dis-satisfactory from an economic perspective, since they always forgo some of the benefits
that one can obtain with a well-designed pricing scheme. Yet, they have the advantage of
better public acceptance in some countries, see, e.g., the “low-emission zones” in German
cities. Thus, it is useful to investigate economic benefits of regulatory measures, and how
close these benefits come to an optimal first-best toll (Proost and van Dender, 2001).
The present study presents an approach to (i) internalize emissions costs, and to (ii)
consider regulatory measures in comparison. Since congestion was treated in a previous
contribution by Nagel et al. (2008), this study now focuses on air pollution. The eventual
goal will be a comprehensive system which treats all external costs simultaneously. First, an
approach is presented that links dynamic traffic flows of the multi-agent transport simulation
MATSim1 to detailed air pollution emission factors provided by the Handbook Emission
Factors for Road Transport (INFRAS, 2010). Emissions are computed every time a traveler
leaves a road segment. They depend on the traffic state on that segment at the specific time, as
well as on the traveler’s vehicle attributes. Second, external air pollution emission costs are
calculated for Sulfur Dioxide (SO2), Particular Matter (PM), Nitrogen Oxides (NOx), Non-
Methane Hydrocarbons (NMHC), and Carbon Dioxide (CO2), following external emission
cost factors provided by Maibach et al. (2008). In a third step, travelers are directly charged
with the resulting costs when leaving a road segment. In an iterative process, travelers learn
how to adapt their route and mode choice behavior in the presence of this simulated first-
best2 air pollution toll. Information about individual generalized costs for possible routes is
1 Multi-Agent Transport Simulation, see www.matsim.org
2 Please note that the simulated toll is first-best with respect to emission cost factors provided by Maibach
et al. (2008). For a discussion with respect to which dimensions this calculated toll is nonetheless in line
with marginal social cost pricing, please refer to Sec. 5.1. In the same section, the reader will also find
a discussion on necessary steps towards the calculation of a first-best air pollution toll with respect to all
relevant dimensions.
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provided to every traveler based on information from the previous iteration. The system’s
state with full air pollution cost pricing is then used as a benchmark for evaluating the
effects of a regulatory measure — a speed limitation to 30 km/h in the inner city of Munich,
Germany.
Please note that the present paper is an extension of Kickho¨fer and Nagel (2012). In con-
trast to the latter, more detailed results are provided and the calculated toll is compared to
values from the literature. Furthermore, the impact of a first-best emission toll is discussed
in the context of short-term vs. long-term behavioral reactions, particularly the role of more
fuel efficient vehicles. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sec. 2 describes
the agent-based microsimulation framework to solve the internalization problem, including
an overview of the emission modeling tool and the internalization procedure. Sec. 3 intro-
duces the scenario, along with the two policy measures and all relevant assumptions. In
Sec. 4, the impacts of the two policies on emissions and social welfare are presented. Sec. 5
compares the obtained average cost factors per vehicle kilometer to values in the literature,
and discusses implications for the interpretation of results. Finally, Sec. 6 summarizes the
main findings and contributions of this paper, and provides venues for further research.
2 Methodology
This section (i) gives a brief overview of the general simulation approach of MATSim, (ii)
shortly describes the emission modeling tool that has been developed by Hu¨lsmann et al.
(2011), and (iii) explains how the emission cost internalization procedure developed by the
authors is embedded in the MATSim framework.
2.1 Transport Simulation with MATSim
In the following, only general ideas about the transport simulation with MATSim are pre-
sented. For in-depth information of the simulation framework, please refer to Raney and
Nagel (2006). In MATSim, each traveler of the real system is modeled as an individual
agent. The approach consists of an iterative loop that is characterized by the following steps:
1. Plans generation: All agents independently generate daily plans from survey data.
These plans encode among other things their desired activities during a typical day as
well as the transport mode for every intervening trip.
2. Traffic flow simulation: All plans are simultaneously executed in the simulation of
the physical environment. In the car traffic flow simulation, agents interact on the roads
which are simulated as first-in first-out queues with flow and storage capacity restrictions
(Gawron, 1998; Cetin et al., 2003). In the present paper, the traffic flow simulation for
public transit (PT) and all other modes simply teleports agents between two activity
locations with a mode-specific travel speed.
3. Evaluating plans: All executed plans are evaluated by a utility function with the fol-
lowing functional form:
Vp =
n
∑
i=1
(
Vperf ,i +Vtr,i
)
, (1)
where Vp is the total utility for a given plan; n is the number of activities; Vperf ,i is
the (positive) utility earned for performing activity i; and Vtr,i is the (usually negative)
utility earned for traveling during trip i (see Sec. 3.2). Activities are assumed to wrap
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around the 24-hours-period, that is, the first and the last activity are stitched together. In
consequence, there are as many trips between activities as there are activities.
4. Learning mechanism: Some agents obtain new plans for the next iteration by modify-
ing copies of existing plans. This modification is done by several strategy modules that
correspond to the available choice dimensions (see Sec. 3.2). The choice between plans
is performed within a multinomial logit model.
The repetition of the iteration cycle coupled with the agent database enables the agents to
improve their plans over many iterations. The iteration cycle continues until the system has
reached a relaxed state. At this point, there is no quantitative measure of when the system is
“relaxed”; the cycle is simply continued until the outcome is stable.
2.2 Emission Modeling Tool
The emission modeling tool was developed by Hu¨lsmann et al. (2011) and is further de-
scribed in Kickho¨fer et al. (2013, in press). The tool essentially calculates warm and cold-
start emissions for private cars.3 The former are emitted when the vehicle’s engine is already
warmed whereas the latter occur during the warm-up phase. In the present paper, warm emis-
sions differ with respect to driving speed, vehicle characteristics and road type. Cold-start
emissions differ with respect to distance traveled, parking time, and vehicle characteristics.4
These characteristics are derived from survey data (see Sec. 3.1) and comprise vehicle type,
age, cubic capacity and fuel type. They can, therefore, be used for very differentiated emis-
sion calculations. Where no detailed information about the vehicle type is available, fleet
averages for Germany are used.
In a first step, MATSim traffic dynamics are mapped to two traffic states of the HBEFA5
database: free flow and stop&go. The handbook provides emission factors differentiated
among the characteristics presented above. In a second step, so-called “emission events” are
generated and segmented into warm and cold emission events. These events provide infor-
mation about person, time, road segment (= link), and absolute emitted values by emission
type. The definition of emission events follows the MATSim framework that uses events for
storing disaggregated information as objects in JAVA and as XML in output files. Emission
event objects can be accessed during the simulation which is necessary in order to assign
cost factors to emissions; the monetary value of emissions is then used for the internalization
procedure described in the next section.
2.3 Emission Cost Calculation: Internalization
The obtained person and link specific time-dependent emissions now need to be converted
into monetary units for the calculation of a first-best toll in order to simulate the full emission
cost Internalization policy. For this purpose, emission cost factors differentiated by emission
type from Maibach et al. (2008) are used (see Tab. 1). Clearly, these cost factors are average
costs, collected from different studies. They differ in terms of more local or more global
3 Public transit is in the present paper assumed to run emission free.
4 In reality, cold start emissions additionally depend on ambient temperature. The model used in the
present paper, however, calculates cold start emissions for average ambient temperatures. In principle,
HBEFA provides emission factors for different ambient temperatures. For a first attempt on how to use mete-
orologic data in this context, see Hu¨lsmann et al. (2013, forthcoming).
5 Handbook on Emission Factors for Road Transport, version 3.1, see www.hbefa.net
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Table 1: Emission cost factors by emission type (Maibach et al., 2008)
Emission type Cost factor [EUR/ton]
CO2 70
NMHC 1’700
NOx 9’600
PM 384’500
SO2 11’000
impacts. To name the two most extreme: CO2 only has an impact on global warming, no
matter where it is emitted. In contrast, PM essentially only has local impacts on human
health. Therefore Maibach et al. (2008) distinguish between three cost factors for PM: in
“outside build-up areas” the factor is calculated to 75’000 EUR/tonne, in “urban areas” to
124’000 EUR/tonne, in “urban/metropolitan areas” to 384’500 EUR/tonne. External costs
from CO2 could easily be internalized by a distance based toll (e.g. fuel tax), whereas a
distance based toll for PM would either imply too low tolls in urban areas, or too high
tolls in non-urban areas. For the present setup, this means that the emission costs outside
of Munich are likely to be overestimated. In consequence, the simulated toll presented in
this paper is first-best with respect to the emission cost factors displayed in Tab. 1. Even
though it is based on average cost factors, the toll is in line with marginal cost pricing in
terms of time-dependent congestion and individual vehicle attributes. For a more detailed
discussion, please see Sec. 5.1. The following two paragraphs will provide an overview of
the first-best emission toll implementation developed by the authors, which is based on the
available person- and link-specific, time-dependent emission costs.
Evaluation of Plans The core of the emission cost internalization is the emission cost mod-
ule which converts any mapping of emission type to a value into monetary terms. This
unique cost module is generated once the simulation starts. Every time the simulation pro-
duces an emission event, the cost module is asked for the monetary value and triggers an
“agent money event” which contains information about person, link, time, and the toll to
be paid. One could imagine that, in the simulation, there is a toll gate at the end of each
link where travelers directly pay the monetary equivalent of the emissions they produced on
that link. When the person’s daily plan is evaluated with a (possibly agent-specific) utility
function at the end of every iteration, all money events of an agent are considered in the
utility calculation. This is a standard MATSim feature which has already been used in other
contributions (Nagel et al., 2008; Kickho¨fer et al., 2010).
Router Module For the router module, the implementation is not as straightforward. Cur-
rently, the router is implemented as a best path algorithm, which uses time-of-day-dependent
link generalized costs (or disutility of traveling) of the previous iteration (Lefebvre and
Balmer, 2007). At the beginning of every iteration, the router proposes new routes to a cer-
tain share of agents based on the attributes travel time and monetary distance costs from the
previous iteration. Since travel times and distance costs are equal for all agents, the router
only needs to generate new routes based on global information. Now, with the internaliza-
tion of emission costs, the disutility of traveling on every link is additionally dependent on
the agent’s vehicle characteristics. Therefore, the router is modified to generate new routes
on very disaggregated information by calculating person-specific expected emission costs
in every time interval. Even though the implementation is working properly, it makes the
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simulation relatively slow, for a 10% sample of the scenario in Sec. 3.1, by a factor of 7.
Therefore, a 1% sample is used in the present paper.6
3 Scenario: Munich, Germany
In this section, a short introduction is given into the large-scale real-world scenario of the
Munich metropolitan area. This is followed by a definition of the available choice dimen-
sions as well as the utility functions. Finally, two policy measures are defined: First, the
Zone 30 policy is a regulatory measure of limiting the maximum speed in the inner city of
Munich to 30 km/h. Second, the Internalization policy uses the methodology from Sec. 2.3
in order to charge every car user when leaving a link dependent on her individual emissions.
3.1 Scenario Setup7
The road network consists of 17’888 nodes and 41’942 road segments. It covers the federal
state of Bavaria, being more detailed in and around the city of Munich and less detailed fur-
ther away. Every link is characterized by a maximum speed, a flow capacity, and a number
of lanes. This information is stored in the road type which is for the emission calculation
always mapped to a corresponding HBEFA road type. In order to obtain a realistic time-
dependent travel demand, several data sources have been converted into the MATSim pop-
ulation format. The level of detail of the resulting individual daily plans naturally depends
on the information available from either disaggregated stated preference data or aggregated
population statistics. Therefore, three subpopulations are created, each corresponding to one
of the three different data sources:
– Urban population (based on Follmer et al. (2004)):
The synthetic population of Munich is created on the base of very detailed survey data
provided by the municipality of Munich RSB (2005), named “Mobility in Germany”
(MiD 2002). Whole activity chains are taken from the survey data for this population.
MiD 2002 also provides detailed vehicle information for every household. Linking this
data with individuals makes it possible to assign a vehicle to a person’s car trip and thus,
calculating emissions based on this detailed information. As of now, there is however
no vehicle assignment module which models intra-household decision making. It is,
therefore, possible that a vehicle is assigned to more than one person at the same time.
The synthetic urban population of Munich consists of 1’424’520 individuals.
– Commuter population (based on Bo¨hme and Eigenmu¨ller (2006)):
Unfortunately, the detailed data for the municipality of Munich does neither contain in-
formation about commuters living outside of Munich and working in Munich nor about
people living in Munich and working outside of Munich. The data analyzed by Bo¨hme
6 In order to run the simulation with a sample of 1%, all flow capacities are scaled down to 1%. This
means, for example, that a link with a capacity of 3600/h will now allow one vehicle every 100 seconds.
Clearly, this leads to larger fluctuations; for example, one vehicle changing routes has a much larger impact.
In order to dampen some of these fluctuations, the link storage capacities, which produce spill-back, were
reduced to 3% instead of 1%. Other studies for car traffic indicate that this approach is sufficient to obtain
realistic congestion patterns (see, e.g., Nagel, 2008, 2011). Since congestion patterns are plausible, it is
assumed that the emissions are realistic as well.
7 Since the scenario setup has been described by Kickho¨fer et al. (2013, in press), only key figures are
presented here.
Towards high-resolution first-best air pollution tolls 7
and Eigenmu¨ller (2006) provides information about workers that are subject to the so-
cial insurance contribution with the base year 2004. With this information, a total of
510’150 synthetic commuters are created from which 306’160 people have their place
of employment in Munich. All commuters perform a daily plan that only encodes two
trips: from their home location to work and back.
– Freight population (based on ITP/BVU (2005)):
Commercial traffic is based on a study published on behalf of the German Ministry of
Transport by ITP/BVU (2005). It provides origin-destination commodity flows through-
out Germany differentiated by mode and ten groups of commodities. After converting
flows that are relevant for the study area into flows of trucks, this population consists of
158’860 agents with one single commercial traffic trip.8
Overall, the synthetic population now consists of 2’093’530 agents. To speed up com-
putations, a 1% sample is used in the subsequent simulations. For commuters and freight, no
detailed vehicle information is available. Emissions are therefore calculated based on fleet
averages for cars and trucks from HBEFA.
3.2 Simulation Approach
Choice Dimensions For the mental layer within MATSim which describes the behavioral
learning of agents, a simple utility based approach is used in this paper. When choosing
between different options with respect to a multinomial logit model, agents are allowed to
adjust their behavior among two choice dimensions: route choice and mode choice. The
former allows individuals to adapt their routes on the road network when going by car. The
latter makes it possible to change the transport mode for a sub-tour within the agent’s daily
plan. Only a switch from car to public transit or the other way around is possible. Trips
that are initially done by any other mode remain fixed within the learning cycle. From a
research point of view, this approach can be seen as defining a system where public transit
is a placeholder for all substitutes of the car mode.
Utility Functions A logarithmic form is used for the positive utility earned by performing
an activity (see e.g. Charypar and Nagel, 2005; Kickho¨fer et al., 2011):
Vperf ,i(tperf ,i) = βperf · t∗,i · ln
(
tperf ,i
t0,i
)
(2)
where tperf ,i is the actual performed duration of activity i, t∗,i is the “typical” duration of
activity i, and βperf is the marginal utility of an activity at its typical duration. βperf is the
same for all activities, since in equilibrium all activities at their typical duration need to
have the same marginal utility. t0,i is a scaling parameter that is related both to the minimum
duration and to the importance of an activity. As long as dropping activities from the plan is
not allowed, t0,i has essentially no effect.
8 This is a rather simple approach of generating freight traffic which is due to the fact that, in the liter-
ature, modeling freight transport has not gained as much attention as passenger transport. However, there is
growing interest in this field since the movement of commodities is increasing, and with it the importance of
better behavioral modeling of firms and their decision making. For example, Giuliano et al. (2010) base their
estimations of freight flows on online sources in order to assure a maximum of transferability and automatic
updating. For a new approach of how to model freight transport in the MATSim framework, please refer to
Schro¨der et al. (2012).
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Table 2: Estimated and adjusted utility parameters; resulting VTTS
(a) Tirachini et al. (2012)
βˆtr,car −0.96 [utils/h]
βˆtr,pt −1.14 [utils/h]
βˆc −0.062 [utils/AUD]
βˆper f n.a. [utils/h]
V T T Str,car +15.48 [AUD/h]
V T T Str,pt +18.39 [AUD/h]
(b) MATSim
βtr,car −0.00 [utils/h]
βtr,pt −0.18 [utils/h]
βc −0.07949 [utils/EUR]
βper f +0.96 [utils/h]
V T T Str,car +12.08 [EUR/h]
V T T Str,pt +14.34 [EUR/h]
In the present paper, travel time and monetary distance costs are considered as attributes
of every car and public transit trip. In consequence, the travel related part of utility (see
Eq. 1) is defined by the following functional form:
Vcar,i, j = βtr,car · ti,car + βc · ci,car
Vpt,i, j = β0 + βtr,pt · ti,pt + βc · ci,pt , (3)
where ti is the travel time of a trip to activity i and ci is the corresponding monetary cost.
Travel times and monetary costs are mode dependent, indicated by the indices. The utilities
Vcar,i, j and Vpt,i, j for person j are computed in “utils”. Due to a lack of behavioral parameters
for the municipality of Munich, estimated parameters9 are taken from an Australian study by
Tirachini et al. (2012); these parameters are shown in Tab. 2a, together with the correspond-
ing Values of Travel Time Savings (VTTS). Necessary adjustments of the parameters are
performed in order to meet the MATSim framework. The resulting parameters and VTTS
are depicted in Tab. 2b. These adjustments are described in more detail in (Kickho¨fer et al.,
2011, 2013, in press). The argument essentially is that the estimated time related parameters
βˆtr,car and βˆtr,pt consist of the unique opportunity costs of time −βper f and an additional
mode specific disutility for traveling βtr,car and βtr,pt , respectively. Since MATSim needs an
explicit value for the opportunity costs of time (see Eq. 2), it is assumed that traveling with
car is not perceived more negatively than “doing nothing”. This interpretation is done that
way since it does not change the VTTS, as a comparison of Tab. 2a and Tab. 2b nicely shows:
the VTTS are only rescaled from AUD to EUR.10 In contrast to Tirachini et al. (2012), the
present model does not include access, egress, and waiting times for public transit. There-
fore, the alternative specific constant (ASC) β0 is re-calibrated by a parametric calibration
process that aims at holding the modal split distribution over distance as close as possible to
the initial distribution. The best fit is found for β0 =−0.75.11
Simulation Procedure For 800 iterations, 15% of the agents perform route adaption (dis-
covering new routes), 15% change the transport mode for a car or PT sub-tour in their daily
plan and 70% switch between their existing plans. Between iteration 801 and 1000 route
and mode adaption is switched off; in consequence, agents only switch between existing
9 Estimated parameters are in this paper flagged by a hat.
10 AUD 1.00 = EUR 0.78 (May 2012).
11 Instead of this rather simple parametric calibration, one could use more advanced techniques, e.g. a
novel approach developed by Flo¨ttero¨d et al. (2011); the authors use their own calibration system “Cadyts”
in order to manipulate the ASC of every traveler’s plan in such way that the simulation better reproduces
real-world traffic counts.
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Fig. 1: Zone 30 policy: road segments (in red) where the speed limitation applies.
options. The output of iteration 1000 is then used as input for the continuation of the base
case and the two different policy cases:
– Base case: unchanged cost structure (see below)
– Policy case 1 (Zone 30): maximum speed on all roads within the middle ring road is
limited to 30 km/h (see Fig. 1)
– Policy case 2 (Internalization): for car users, additional costs apply for every link; they
are dependent on the emissions emitted by an agent (see Sec. 2.3)
The reason for choosing a speed limitation policy for evaluation is that, in Germany, it
is currently discussed to regulate the maximum speed in the inner cities to 30 km/h. The
current speed limits are (with some exceptions) 60 km/h on primary roads, 50 km/h on
secondary roads, and 30 km/h on tertiary roads.
User costs12 for car are always fixed to 30 EURct/km. For the Internalization policy,
additional costs apply (see above). User costs for public transit are assumed to be constant
at 18 EURct/km for the base case and both policy cases.
All simulations are continued for another 500 iterations. Again, during the first 400 it-
erations 15% of the agents perform route adaption while another 15% of agents choose
between car and public transit for one of their sub-tours. The remaining agents switch be-
tween existing plans. For the final 100 iterations only a fixed choice set is available for all
agents. When evaluating the impact of the two policy measures, the final iteration 1500 of
every policy case is compared to iteration 1500 of the base case.
12 Please note, that the term “user costs” is referred to as out-of-pocket costs for the users.
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4 Results
In this section, different changes to the system are presented that result from the two policy
measures. The main goal is to answer the question how close the regulatory measure (Zone
30) comes to an optimal first-best toll (Internalization) in terms of emission reduction and
economic benefits. A further discussion of the results is provided in Sec. 5. All results in
this section are rescaled from the 1% sample to the full scenario for a regular week day in
the scenario described in Sec. 3.1.
4.1 Emissions
Starting with analyzing the final iteration of the base case, Fig. 2a shows absolute emission
levels by emission type and subpopulation. Note that the commuter population is differ-
entiated into people commuting to Munich for work (commuters), and people commuting
from Munich to work outside of Munich (reverse commuters). Also note that the scale is
different for different pollutants in order to make absolute values visible in one graph. One
can clearly see that the urban population only contributes to a relatively small part for most
emission types, even though these people represent 68% of the total population and perform
more trips per day than the other subpopulations. Only NMHC is relatively more impor-
tant for the urban population. This is presumably due to the fact that NMHC emissions are
highest for cold-starts and during the warm-up phase of the vehicle (Schmitz et al., 2000).
Thus, two possible explanations come to mind: first, urban car travelers drive relatively short
distances (median distance traveled: 12 km). This means that — in some cases — the en-
gine is not even completely warmed up when reaching the destination. Second, due to a
higher number of trips per day, the urban population produces more cold starts per car user
during a day than the other subpopulations who — in the present model — only perform
two trips (commuters and reverse commuters) or one trip (freight), respectively. Commuters
(14.6% of the total population) and reverse commuters (9.8%) seem to have a similar split
of the different pollutants. However, commuters emit in total about three times as much as
reverse commuters as they drive longer distances (median commuters: 100 km; median re-
verse commuters: 65 km). Finally, freight traffic also drives rather long distances (median
freight: 110 km). Even though freight traffic represents only 7.6% of the total population, it
contributes to a major part of total emissions: its share for CO2 is roughly 50%, for NMHC
30%, for NOx 78%, for PM 70%, and for SO2 47%. Here, the distance effect might play
a role, but the major reason presumably is that trucks produce much higher emissions per
vehicle kilometer than normal cars.
To answer the question on how close the Zone 30 policy comes to the Internalization
policy in terms of emission reduction, Fig. 2b shows the relative changes in emissions for
the two policies. The Zone 30 reduces NMHC by around 2%, CO2 and SO2 are only slightly
reduced by 0.1%, NOx remains unchanged, and PM is even increasing. The impacts of
an Internalization policy result in a much more homogeneous picture: all pollutants are
reduced by 0.6% to 1.1%. Fig. 2c decomposes the information from Fig. 2b to the different
subpopulations. The picture becomes even more interesting: the Zone 30 leads to a strong
emission reduction of 5% to 6% for the urban population. All other subpopulations produce
more emissions. In contrast, the Internalization policy leads to a rather strong decrease of
emissions, by 1% to 2% for urban travelers and commuters and between 1.5% and 3% for
reverse commuters. Only freight traffic does not significantly reduce emissions. Given the
available choice dimensions presented in Sec. 3.2, the above emission effects result directly
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(c) Policy cases: relative changes in emissions by type and subpopulation
Fig. 2: Emissions by emission type: absolute values by subpopulation for the base case,
relative changes (overall and by subpopulation) for the two policy cases.
12 B. Kickho¨fer, K. Nagel
Table 3: Changes in modal split and average car distance traveled
(a) Zone 30 policy
Subpopulation change in car trips [%] change in avg. car dist. traveled [km]
URBAN −7.00 −0.08
COMMUTER −0.43 +0.29
REV COMMUTER −0.87 +1.01
FREIGHT ±0.00 +0.02
(b) Internalization policy
Subpopulation change in car trips [%] change in avg. car dist. traveled [km]
URBAN −0.59 −0.10
COMMUTER −0.62 −0.89
REV COMMUTER −1.22 −1.52
FREIGHT ±0.00 −0.15
from re-routing and changes in the modal split. Additionally, they may result indirectly
from changes in congestion. Tab. 3a and Tab. 3b show the relative change in car trips and
the absolute change in the average car distance traveled. Expectedly, the car mode becomes
less attractive for both policies as the second column in either table shows. The Zone 30
reduces car trips of urban travelers by 7%. The remaining car users on average drive slightly
shorter distances (−0.08 km). This may be due to the fact that travelers with longer distances
have a tendency to switch to PT; or the remaining car users re-route to shorter paths. A
combination of the two effects is most likely. When comparing this to the Internalization
policy, it becomes obvious that the Zone 30 pushes too many urban travelers to public transit.
For commuters and reverse commuters, the change in number of car trips is not very different
for the two policies. However, for the Zone 30, the re-route effect for the remaining car users
becomes visible by longer average distances in order to avoid the unattractive zone with the
speed limitation (commuters: +0.29 km, reverse commuters: +1.01 km). Freight traffic also
re-routes around the regulated zone.
Overall, one can conclude that in terms of total emission reduction, the Zone 30 is con-
siderably less successful than the Internalization policy. Additionally, the Zone 30 reduces
the emission levels of the urban population too strongly while even increasing the emission
levels of the other subpopulations. The latter is — in comparison to the first-best Internal-
ization policy — exactly the wrong direction.
4.2 Economic Evaluation
Starting again with analyzing the base case, Fig. 3a shows the absolute user benefits W
in million Euro per day. It is calculated as the user logsum or Expected Maximum Utility
(EMU) for all choice sets of the users of the respective subpopulation pop:
Wpop = logsumpop = EMUpop =
J
∑
j=1
(
1
|βc| ln
P
∑
p=1
eVp
)
, (4)
where βc is the cost related parameter of the multinomial logit model or the negative marginal
utility of money, J is the number of agents in the subpopulation, P is the number of plans or
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alternatives of individual j, and Vp is the systematic part of utility of alternative (= plan) p.
The urban population contributes most to overall user benefits. On the one hand, this stems
from the fact that they represent a major part of the total population. On the other hand,
they spend less time on transport, travel shorter distances and can, thus, spend more time on
performing activities while paying less distance costs.
When introducing the two policies, one obtains absolute changes in user benefits by
subpopulation, represented by yellow bars in Fig. 3b. The Zone 30 policy leads to a loss in
user logsum for all subpopulations, with the effect on urban travelers being the strongest,
while almost having no effect on freight traffic. That is, urban travelers react most sensible
by changing from car to public transit, especially for longer trips. The remaining car users
can barely profit from reduced car demand in the city since travel times by car are no longer
determined by congestion but by the maximum free speed of 30 km/h. Commuters and
reverse commuters change to PT only for shorter trips. The remaining car users drive longer
distances (e.g. on the middle ring road) since driving though the inner city has become less
attractive due to the speed limit. Freight traffic can only change routes which seems to have
a minor effect on user benefit.
The Internalization policy on the right side yields quite different results: commuters,
reverse commuters and freight all lose in terms of user logsum (in yellow); the loss is most
pronounced for freight traffic. This intuitively makes sense since freight traffic contributes
to a major part of total emissions (see Sec. 4.1) and therefore it has to pay a major part of the
total emission costs. In contrast, the urban population even gains slightly in terms of user
logsum despite the toll they have to pay. Time gains for the urban population slightly over-
compensate the negative effect of the toll payments. When assuming a redistribution of the
toll payments of every subpopulation (blue bars in Fig. 3b) to the respective subpopulation,
one obtains the net welfare effect for that population (red bars in Fig. 3b). Interestingly, the
redistribution of the toll payments overcompensates the loss in user logsum for commuters,
reverse commuters, and freight. For urban travelers, the welfare gain becomes even more
important, being the highest of all subpopulations. That is, for all subpopulations, the emis-
sion toll implicitly reduces congestion and in that way also works as a congestion pricing
scheme that increases welfare.
In addition to the changes in user benefit and toll payments, a comprehensive calculation
of the total welfare effect needs to include the absolute monetary change in emission costs
resulting from the policies. Cost reductions for society due to lower emission levels are — in
contrast to time gains — not included in the user logsum; this is due to the fact that emission
costs are true external costs for the transport market.13 Fig. 3c depicts the absolute change
in external emission costs resulting from the two policies. When looking at the scaling of
the y-axis, it becomes obvious that these changes in emission costs do not have the potential
of compensating any losses in user benefit in Fig. 3b. However, the figure allows interesting
insights into the welfare effect of the two policies: for the Zone 30, the loss in user benefit for
commuters, reverse commuters, and freight is even becoming bigger due to higher emissions
and therefore higher emission costs for society. The deadweight loss for urban travelers is
reduced by a small amount. For the Internalization policy, all user groups contribute to a
reduction in deadweight loss of society. This figure is naturally quite similar to Fig. 2c. A
further discussion of the results will be given in the next section.
13 The same is true for other external costs that are currently not quantified in the present model, e.g. noise
emissions, accidents, etc. It is expected that the emission toll, again, implicitly reduces these external costs
and therefore has further positive effects on the wellbeing of residents or property values.
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(c) Policy cases: absolute change in external emission cost by subpopulation
Fig. 3: Welfare analysis by subpopulation: absolute values for the base case, absolute
changes for the two policy cases; all values scaled to a 100% scenario.
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Table 4: Base case: resulting average emission costs by subpopulation [EURct/km]
Subpopulation incl. CO2 excl. CO2
URBAN 2.71 1.20
COMMUTER 2.27 1.02
REV COMMUTER 2.25 1.02
FREIGHT 14.51 10.29
5 Discussion
5.1 Discussion of the Internalization Approach
Emission cost factors: Tab. 4 shows average external emission costs per vehicle kilometer
for the different subpopulations that are calculated from the simulation of the base case.14
The second column depicts average emission costs per vehicle kilometer including CO2, the
third column excluding CO2. When comparing the latter to values from the literature, one
can state that the approach of coupling MATSim with HBEFA and then using cost factors
from Maibach et al. (2008) leads to plausible average emission costs per vehicle kilometer:
e.g. Parry and Small (2005) use local pollution cost factors for automobiles of 2.0 US-
Dct/mile or roughly 1.23 EURct/km. This estimate is very close to the resulting value for
urban travelers in the present scenario. Obviously, freight traffic causes much higher pollu-
tion costs since it produces more emissions. The values for commuter and reverse commuter
are identical and distinctly lower than those for urban travelers. This indicates that the emis-
sion tool, since it is accounting for different traffic states, feeds the cost calculation module
with spatially and temporally differentiated values: commuters and reverse commuters who
drive a major part of their routes on a non-congested network outside of Munich produce less
emissions per vehicle kilometer. That is, the high-resolution emission costs in the present
model are based on average cost factors; these are, however, average costs per amount of pol-
lutant, and since these amounts are influenced by congestion effects and vehicle attributes,
the resulting costs are marginal costs with respect to congestion and vehicle attributes.
Nonetheless, in order to calculate marginal air pollution costs also with respect to dam-
age of human health, cost factors would need to differentiate among the number of individ-
uals that are exposed to a certain pollution concentration. The implications of this drawback
for the interpretation of results are discussed in the following paragraph.
Implications for the interpretation of results: Looking again at Fig. 3b and Fig. 3c clarifies
that the speed limitation to 30 km/h in the inner city of Munich leads to more market inef-
ficiencies than a “do-nothing” strategy. When taking the Internalization policy as a bench-
mark, these two figures show that the emission cost reduction is too high for urban travelers;
for all other subpopulations, this speed limitation even leads to an increase in emission costs
for society. That is, too high generalized prices for the urban population, too low generalized
prices for all other subpopulations. Yet, one could argue that the Zone 30 yields much better
results when looking at exposure to emission concentration rather than emissions. Emission
cost factors from Maibach et al. (2008) are average costs and, thus, probably too low in the
inner city and too high outside of Munich. For this reason, it is planned to model the whole
14 Please note that the numbers in Tab. 4 are an output — not an input — of the simulation in order to
compare the values to other sources. Remember that the individual toll is highly differentiated since it depends
on vehicle attributes and time-dependent dynamic traffic flows of the simulation.
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impact-path-chain of air pollution in the near future which implies an exposure analysis of
the whole population, and monetizing the effects on human health. A first step into the mod-
eling of emission concentration has been done by Hu¨lsmann et al. (2013, forthcoming), who
introduce pricing measures for emission concentration hotspots. The next step will be to
model the number of people that are exposed to that concentration. And finally, a monetiza-
tion of this effect. Once exposure is considered, one may argue that the optimal toll should
be corrected exactly for that effect. I.e., by putting weights on every link that are differenti-
ated by emission type and resulting exposure. Weights for CO2 would be low since it mostly
has a global effect, whereas weights for PM would be high due to its strong local effect
on human health. A different approach could also be worth modeling: the calculation of an
optimal toll given the desired emission reduction in the area under consideration. This may,
similar to the Zone 30, be dis-satisfactory from an economic perspective but may arguably
be more likely to happen in reality than the implementation of a first-best pricing scheme.
5.2 Discussion of Freight Traffic
Lorry types: As mentioned earlier, freight traffic contributes to a major part of total emis-
sions while only representing under 10% of the total population. This is the result of two
effects: (i) freight drives longer distances than all other subpopulations. (ii) freight produces
more emissions per vehicle kilometer. Additionally to these two effects, it is likely that big-
ger lorries drive longer distances than small trucks. Since in the present paper, all trucks
are assumed to be of the same vehicle type, the contribution to total emissions is, in reality,
expected to be even higher than presented in Sec. 4.1.
Behavioral parameters: Originally, the behavioral modeling of freight was not the focus
of the present paper. As mentioned in Sec. 3.1, freight demand was included into the sce-
nario in a simplified way for completeness. Since no behavioral parameters for freight were
available, they are the same as for all other agents. In consequence, the assumed VTTS is
lower than usually found in empirical studies. This implies that the reaction of freight to
the different policy cases is too sensitive. In consequence, the results for freight are biased.
However, since freight is only allowed to adapt routes and not mode as all other subpopula-
tions, this bias is unlikely to be very important. In order to get an estimate of the resulting
effect, the impact of this bias on travel patterns and economic evaluation of the policy cases
is discussed next:
– In general: A higher VTTS for freight implies (ceteris paribus) a lower marginal utility of
money. Given the computed behavioral reactions, this results in larger absolute welfare
changes than presented in this paper when monetizing utility gains.
– Zone 30: A too low VTTS has no effect on routing since there is no trade-off between
a toll and travel time. Only the above effect applies in the economic evaluation. The
welfare effects for freight are very small (see Fig. 3b), and even multiplying them by a
factor would not change the results significantly.
– Internalization: A too low VTTS has an effect on routing: it results in routes with too
short distances and too long travel times. A higher VTTS would therefore result in (i)
longer distances and (ii) shorter travel times. With longer distances, if the distance ef-
fect of emissions dominates the congestion effect, freight would produce even higher
emissions and also pay more toll than presented in this paper. With shorter travel times,
freight would have higher utility gains due to congestion relief. Additionally, the above
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monetization effect applies in the economic evaluation. That is, for the internalization
policy, the results presented in this paper underestimate the toll payments of freight, as
well as the welfare change after redistribution.
The above clearly shows that there is a strong need for improving demand and behavioral
modeling of freight transport. Especially because of its major impact on total emissions, a
more profound understanding of the relevant processes in freight transport is necessary in
order to be able build policy-sensitive demand on a micro-level.
5.3 Discussion of Long-Term Changes to the Vehicle Fleet
The results presented in Sec. 4 provide short-term emission and welfare effects with respect
to the choice dimensions route choice and mode choice. On a very different level of detail,
this section now aims at presenting rough estimates on how big the short-term impact is
in comparison to possible long-term user reactions. These long-term reactions might, for
instance, include changes in the vehicle fleet15: the environmental toll could induce people
to buy more fuel / emission efficient cars. Two possible long-term reactions come to mind:
First, some users that — in the short run — changed to public transit would in the long run
possibly buy a more emission efficient car and change back to car. Second, users who travel
by car before and after the policy could also buy more emission efficient cars. Compared to
the short-term impacts of the Internalization policy, the former would increase car vehicle
kilometers traveled as well as emissions, and therefore also increase toll payments. The latter
is likely to increase vehicle kilometers traveled but would lower emissions per vehicle kilo-
meter; the impact on total toll payments is dependent on the magnitude of these sub-effects.
Parry and Small (2005) state that “[...] less than half of the long-run price responsiveness
of gasoline consumption is due to changes in VMT” (vehicle miles traveled). According
to them, the rest of the decrease in gasoline consumption results from changes in the vehi-
cle fleet. Assuming a linear relationship between gasoline consumption and emissions, this
would imply that vehicle kilometers in the long run and for the same price signal would drop
by less than 0.5 of the reduction in emissions. Erath and Axhausen (2010) calculate propen-
sities to change car types from a discrete-continuous choice model for an average fuel price
increase of 100%. In principle, it would be possible to transfer the resulting propensities to
the MATSim framework. Since there is, however, not a similar study for the city of Mu-
nich, randomly drawing agents in the population for vehicle replacement would result in
biased statistics. The reason for this is that the probabilities would not be linked to the users’
preferences, socio-demographics, or locations.16
In order to determine the long-term effect of changes in the vehicle fleet for the current
setup, parametric studies were performed with the assumption that all vehicles are affected
uniformly by the improvement in fuel efficiency. Fig. 4 shows parametric estimates of rel-
15 Additionally there might be changes in activity location choice, changes in the frequency of performing
activities, and changes in bundling activities. A possible approach on how to deal with these possible user
reactions within the MATSim framework can be found in Horni et al. (2012).
16 Consider the following example with two persons owning a car of the same vehicle class: Assume that
the probability of buying a more emission efficient car as reaction to the Internalization policy is 50% for
their vehicle class. When randomly drawing, one would expect one of the persons to buy a new car. However,
if the first person lives next to a public transit line and the second is not, it is more likely that the second
person buys a more fuel efficient vehicle; the first could more easily change to public transport and might not
buy a new car.
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Fig. 4: Impacts of fuel efficient cars on fuel reduction: parametric estimates by subpopulation
ative changes in total fuel consumption over five different levels of fleet fuel efficiency.17
Level 0.0% is equivalent to the short term reactions (Internalization policy) presented in
Sec. 4: users are not able to buy more fuel efficient cars. Level 2.5% to 10.0% imply that
the whole vehicle fleet is 2.5% to 10.0% more fuel efficient, meaning that users on average
buy x% more fuel efficient cars as a reaction to the Internalization policy. Fig. 4 also pro-
vides regression functions for the data points of every subpopulation. As one can nicely see
for freight traffic, which is only allowed to adjust routes, the short term re-routing reaction
to the Internalization policy at level 0.0% leads to a relative reduction in fuel consump-
tion of −0.2737%. On top of this effect, the increase in fuel efficiency leads to an almost
proportional reduction in total fuel consumption as the slope of the regression function in-
dicates (1% higher fuel efficiency leads to −0.9965% less consumption). Urban travelers
and commuters react more sensitively to the Internalization policy since they are addition-
ally allowed to change to public transit. This is depicted by the stronger change in total fuel
consumption at level 0.0% (urban: −1.6365%, commuter: −1.5188%, reverse commuter:
−2.7015%). For urban travelers and commuters, a change in fleet fuel efficiency leads to
a slightly under-proportional reduction in fuel consumption, reflecting the second order ef-
17 Please note that the parametric estimates also take into account second order effects in the sense that
higher fuel efficiency lowers the optimal toll; compared to the short term reactions at level 0.0%, this leads in
the present model to a modal shift towards car and longer distances traveled.
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fects of shifting back to car and to longer distances. For reverse commuters, this effect is not
found.
Now, the long-term effect of changes in the vehicle fleet can be determined approxi-
mately as follows: Erath and Axhausen (2010) predict an average change in fleet fuel effi-
ciency of 5% as a reaction to an average fuel price increase of 100%. As Tab. 4 indicates,
the average price increase per vehicle kilometer including CO2 between the base case and
the Internalization policy is roughly 10% for urban travelers and commuters (2.25 to 2.71
EURct/km on top of the monetary distance costs of 30 EURct/km). Following Erath and
Axhausen (2010), an increase in the vehicle fleet emission efficiency of 0.5% is assumed.
In addition, it is assumed that more fuel efficient cars are not more expensive than normal
cars and, thus, changing the vehicle does not imply any additional investment. Using the re-
gression function from Fig. 4, a 0.5% increase in the vehicle fleet fuel efficiency would lead
to additional changes in total fuel consumption. Thus, some additional changes in total fuel
consumption are expected due to long-term adjustments in the vehicle fleet. These occur
on top of the short-term effect; the differences to the assumed 0.5% increase in the vehicle
fuel efficiency are, however, relatively small. One can therefore state that accounting for car
ownership decisions would only have a minor impact on the results obtained in this paper.
The reason could be that the price signal of the Internalization policy is not strong enough
to significantly change long-term route choice and mode choice behavior.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, a new simulation approach was presented to internalize external air pollution
costs for a real-world large-scale scenario using an agent-based model. The resulting exhaust
emission and welfare effects were used as a benchmark for the evaluation of a regulatory
measure — a speed limitation to 30 km/h in the inner city of Munich. The main method-
ological contribution was the calculation of a high-resolution first-best air pollution toll in
a real-world scenario. This comprised, on the one hand, the implementation of a module
that evaluates different alternatives of every agent for the choice model. On the other hand, a
router module which is needed for the calculation of time-dependent least cost paths through
the network. Both modules account for individual vehicle attributes and time-dependent traf-
fic states. Since agents additionally interact in the physical environment of the network, the
resulting toll is equal to agent-specific marginal social costs in terms of vehicle attributes
and congestion-based emissions.
In terms of absolute emissions, the highest share is contributed by freight, followed by
commuters. Urban travelers have a minor impact even though they represent almost 70%
of the total population. When comparing the regulatory measure to the full emission cost
Internalization policy, it is found that the regulatory measure is considerably less successful
in terms of total emission reduction. It reduces emissions of urban travelers too much while
even increasing the emissions of commuters and freight, both leading to a increase in dead-
weight loss. That is, the regulatory measure leads to higher market inefficiencies than a “do-
nothing” strategy: too high generalized prices for urban travelers, too low generalized prices
for commuters and freight. The Internalization policy increases welfare for all subpopu-
lations, even without the benefits from reduced emission costs. That is, the toll implicitly
reduces congestion and therefore also works as a congestion pricing scheme. Additionally,
it is likely to have further positive effects on welfare, e.g. by reducing noise emissions or
increasing property values.
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Furthermore, the analysis of the simulated first-best air pollution toll showed that the
resulting average emission costs per vehicle kilometer are very close to estimates in the
literature. However, neither the emission tolls nor the estimates from the literature do reflect
marginal costs with respect to damage of human health since they do not differentiate among
the number of individuals that are exposed to a certain pollution concentration. Introducing
a correction term might improve the emission and welfare effects of the Zone 30 policy. For
this reason it is planned to model the whole impact-path-chain of air pollution which implies
an exposure analysis of the whole population and a monetization of these effects.
Due to the simplified way of generating freight demand and modeling its behavioral
reactions, the total emissions of freight are presumably even higher than in this paper. Addi-
tionally, for the Internalization policy, this paper is likely to underestimate the toll payments
of freight, as well as the positive welfare change after redistribution. This clearly shows that
there is a strong need for research that aims at improving demand and behavioral modeling
of freight transport.
The final discussion on long-term changes to the vehicle fleet shows that there are addi-
tional changes in total fuel consumption and emissions when assuming that travelers react
to the Internalization policy by buying more fuel efficient cars. However, due to the rather
weak price signal, this is not found to significantly change long-term route and mode choice
decisions.
In principle, the approach presented in this paper allows the evaluation of any regulatory
policy. Here, the goal was to present the methodology by means of a fictive speed limitation
in the inner city. Other (maybe more realistic) policies come to mind, for example speed
limitations or pricing schemes on certain road categories. After solving some of the issues
related to freight traffic, the appraisal of these policies provides interesting venues for more
practical research in the future. A first step into this direction is a recent paper by Hu¨lsmann
et al. (2013, forthcoming), who, in a similar scenario, price roads with high emission con-
centrations.
Another important, even though more practical contribution of this paper is the follow-
ing: it could be demonstrated that the simulation of first-best emission tolls is possible in
a real-world setup and that it could be used as a benchmark for second-best policies. This
seems to be highly relevant for politicians and decision makers.
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